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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
AGENCY-ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-PROMISE OF AN
ADDITIONAL FEE-Coon v. Ewing, Texas Court of Civil
Appeals, 1925, 275 S. W. 481.
Ewing, an attorney, brought this action against Coon to recover
compensation for legal services rendered by defending Coon in an
action concerning property which Coon owned. Ewing was hired by
another attorney, Meek, agent for Coon, to assist Meek in defending
Coon. At that time the parties agreed that Ewing should have $2500
as compensation for his services. Just before the trial, Ewing discov-
ered that Meek had misrepresented the facts of the case, that instead
of being slightly contested as Meek had said, the case was going to
be hotly contested, and that a boundary question which Meek had said
would not be involved, was going to be included in the controversy.
Thereupon, Ewing refused to continue with the trial work unless Coon
would give him a $2500 fee in addition to the amount previously
agreed upon. After some wrangling, Coon promised to give the addi-
tional $2500 if Ewing won the suit for him. Coon won, and then
refused to pay the additional $2500, for which Ewing brought this
action. The defendant contended that the promise was to pay for
services which the plaintiff was already under a contractual obligation
to perform, and therefore without consideration and void. The court,
however, agreeing with the contentions of the plaintiff, said that in
this case the mistakes as to the facts involved in the litigation were
such unforeseen difficulties and burdens as to take the case out of the
operation of the general rule, that the plaintiff had taken no unfair
advantage of the defendant, as the compensation was fair and rea-
sonable, and therefore, there was sufficient consideration for the new
agreement for the added compensation.
It is the general rule in contract law that a promise to pay addi-
tional compensation in order to secure the performance of that which
the other party is already under an existing contractual obligation to
perform is invalid, and not enforceable, Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 91
N. Y. 392; Lingenfelder v. Wainwright 103 Mo. 578, 15 S. W. 844;
Ayres v. Chicago Ry. Co., 52 Ia. 478; Shriner v.. Craft, 166 Ala. 146,
51 So. 884, 28 L. R. A. N. S. 450; Galway v. Pragnano, 134 N. Y.
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S. 571; Williston "Contracts" Vol. 1, Sec. 130; 13 C. J., sec. 209, note
45, and cases cited. This rule, however, has been subject to various
exceptions in some states. Some courts have enforced the promise of
additional compensation on the ground that the promisor had the right
to elect whether he would continue with the contract or break the con-
tract and subject himself to damages, and his election to complete the
contract furnished sufficient consideration for the new agreement,
Munroe v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 298, 20 Am. Dec. 475; Coyner v. Lynde,
10 Ind. 282; Bishop v. Busse, 69 Ill. 403. Other courts have upheld
the promise of additional compensation on the theory that the parties
may mutually rescind the old contract and make a new one, Osborne
v. O'Reilly, 42 N. J. Eq. 467; Coyner v. Lynde, 10 Ind. 282. While
still other courts have enforced the promise of additional compen-
sation when the contractor has encountered unforseen difficulties or
mistake, King v. Duluth, 61 Minn. 82; 63 N. W. 1105; Linz v. Shuck,
106 Md. 220, 67 Atl. 286, 11 L. R. A. N. S. 789, 14 Ann. Cas. 495.
The cases concerning the promise by a client to pay an attorney com-
pensation in addition to the amount promised when the relationship
of attorney and client was entered into present a trend of decisions
analagous to the law in contracts generally. The relationship of attor-
ney and client, however, brinigs in another very important factor.
That factor is the fact that the relationship of attorney and client
is a confidential one of such a nature that the attorney is in such a
position as to unduly influence his client; therefore, the relation is
zealously guarded, and the burden is upon the attorney to show that
the agreement was entered into by the client of his own free will,
and that the agreement was fair and reasonable. One case has gone
so far as to say that in dealings between the attorney and the client
for the former's benefit are presumptively invalid as constructively
fraudulent, and the burden is on the attorney to show that they
are fair and entered into by the client's own free will, Thomas Tur-
ners Adm'rs (1890) 87 Va. 1. Another court in speaking of the at-
torney said, "He must be aggressive and advance against the pre-
sumption of invalidity, and overcome it if he can by evidence of fair-
ness, adequacy and equity of the transaction . . . and must show
that his client was informed of all the facts known to himself." Burn-
ham v. Heselton, 82 Me. 495, 20 Atl. 80, 9 L. R. A. 90. As is the
rule in general contract law, an agreement for compensation in addi-
tion to the fee agreed upon at the beginning of the relation of attor-
ney and client is, in the absence of peculiar facts, without considera-
tion and not enforceable. In Lecatt v. Salle (1836) 3 Port. (Ala.)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol11/iss2/7
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
115, the early leading American case in which, following the English
cases, the court laid down the rule that the subsequent agreement for
additional compensation could not be enforced by the attorney, the
court said, "The firmest ground for the support of the principle to
which the complainant (client) has resorted for relief, consists of the
confidence reposed by a client in his attorney, and the influence which
an attorney has over client. . . . No principle has been more
rigidly adhered to by the English chancellors. . . . This confidence
between the attorney and the client has been an important point in
all the later cases which refused to uphold the agreement for the addi-
tional fee on grounds of public policy, and a basis for the rule that
the burden is on the attorney to show the fairness of the agreement.
In 1896, the Alabama court said that no subsequent agreement with
the client for added compensation can be supported unless a fair and
just remuneration for his services, White v. Tolliver, 100 Ala. 300; 20
So. 97. This last mentioned case shows a slight tendency to depart
from the rigid rule laid down in Lecatt v. Sallee, supra, but it is still
in general conformity with the rule laid down there. Incidentally, the
above mentioned Alabama rule is in conformity with the rule in other
contracts in Alabama, Shriner v. Craft, 166 Ala. 146, 51 So. 884, 28
L. R. A. N. S. 450. In 1878, when an attorney in a divorce suit
refused to continue with the case unless promised a larger fee, the
court held that he could be compelled to state what his reasons were
for refusing to continue with the case, Bolton v. Daily, 48 Ia. 348. In
1892, the Arkansas court decided that the promise of a client to give
his attorney a mule in addition to his regular fee was not enforceable,
Marshall v. Dossett, 57 Ark. 93, 20 S. W. 810. In another case, the
promise to pay an attorney an additional fee to bring on a speedy
trial, an act which was considered to be within the ordinary scope of
an attorney's services, was declared to be without consideration and
not enforceable, Bailey v. Devine (1905), 123 Ga. 653, 51 S. E. 603.
In 1910, an Illinois appellate court held an agreement for additional
compensation unenforceable, Miller v. Lloyd, 181 Ill. A. 230. The
same rule was adopted in Egan v. Burnight, 34 S. D. 473, 149 N. W.
176 (1914), and in Vance v. Ellison et al. 75 W. Va. 592, 85 S. E.
776; in the latter it was said that the promise by a client to pay an
attorney $1000 for services which he was already under an obligation
to perform for $500 was without consideration and unenforceable.
The early Texas cases indicate the adoption of a similar rule, Kahle
v. Plummer (1903) 74 S. W. 786, and Waterbury Water Co. v. City
of Laredo, 68 Tex. 565. However, the general rule that the subse-
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quent agreement for additional compensation for the attorney for
services which the attorney was bound to render by a prior agreement
for a smaller fee is subject to exceptions in some jurisdictions. The
exceptions depend upon the jurisdiction in which the action is laid and
upon the particular facts of the cases. The exceptions are chiefly to
be found in cases where the attorney has been placed in such a posi-
tion that he must do work which was not contemplated in the original
agreement, or where the court has adopted the theory that the parties
may mutually rescind the old agreement and make a new one. In
1919, the Texas court allowed an attorney to recover on a promise of
an additional fee when the facts indicated that the new agreement
covered additional work. The decision was based on the theory that
the parties could mutually rescind the old agreement and make a new
contract, Laybourn v. Bray & Shifflet, Texas (1919) 214 S. W. 630.
This last mentioned case was a step toward the rule laid down in
Coon v. Ewing, briefed at the beginning of this note, that the attorney
could recover the promise of the additional fee as he had encountered
additional work and had been mistaken as to the services necessary in
the original agreement. These last two cases seem to have almost
completely abrogated the old Texas rule that the promise of an addi-
tional fee could not be enforced, Kahle v. Plummer, 74 S. W. 786;
Waterbury Water Co. v. City of Laredo, 68 Tex. 565. Three recent
Minnesota cases indicate that the new agreement for a larger fee is
enforceable in that state. In one the court said, "The mere fact that
the amount which the attorney was to receive was changed subse-
quent to the employment does not invalidate the contract." Anker v.
Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. (1919) 174 N. W. 840. In another the court
said that the client has an unrestricted right to agree with the attorney
as to his compensation. "That this right includes the right to modify
an exising contract on the subject, and if the modification be free
from fraud or unfairness, the courts are bound to respect it," Erikson
v. Boyum (1921), 184 N. W. 961. While in the other case the court
allowed the additional fee where the services to be rendered were
larger than had been originally contemplated, Farmer v. Stillwater
Water Co., 108 Minn. 41, 127 N. W. 48. The above mentioned MirA-
nesota rule in attorney and client cases is in conformity with the Min-
nesota rule in other contract cases in which they are contrary to the
general rule, and allow the contractor to recover when he has broken
his contract and has later gone on and completed the contract when
promised additional compensation. In 1915, the St. Louis Court of
Appeals allowed an attorney to recover an additional 5% fee which
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was promised by the client in return for the attorney's personal atten-
tion in taking a deposition in the state of California. The court recog-
nized the general rule, but said that the services were such as were
not contemplated in the original agreement, and, therefore, could be
recovered, Bishop v. Vaughn, 172 S. W. 644. These cases show that
it is the general rule that the promise of a client to pay a fee in addi-
tion to the fee agreed upon at the beginning of the relation of attor-
ney and client for the same services is void and not enforceable. That
the exceptions to this rule depend upon the facts of the particular case
and the state where the case is tried, and that Minnesota has gone
the farthest in allowing the attorney to recover the increased fee
because of the fact that the Minnesota courts will construe the new
agreement to be an abrogation of the old agreement and the forma-
M. L. S., '27.
BANKRUPTCY-CLAIMS-SALES-BAILMENTS.-In re Belle,
District Court W. D. Pennsylvania, 1925.
The petitioner, one Herman Goldberg, sought to repossess and
recover from the receiver in bankruptcy certain drug store fixtures.
The fixtures in question had been in the possession of the bankrupt
under a contract which is in the correct form of a bailment contract,
and alleged by the petitioner to be a bailment lease. The receiver,
after this petition, had asked for a sale of the bankrupt's personalty,
including the latter's interest in the fixtures claimed by Goldberg.
Contemporaneously with the so-called lease, a contract of sale of the
stock of goods in the store was entered into between Goldberg as
vendor and the bankrupt Belle as vendee. Certain down payments
were made and the remainder of the purchase price was payable by
monthly installments of $100 each. By this contract, when the
whole was paid on the goods, Goldberg was to give a bill of sale for
the fixtures. Title and possession of the stock of goods were not
deferred, but given immediately. Held: the contract concerning the
fixtures, while in form a bailment, is in reality a conditional sale.
The surrounding facts determine the real nature of the transaction.
Under Pennsylvania law the fixtures could not be recovered from the
receiver.
This decision is rightfully reached by construing the fixtures con-
tract in the light of extraneous facts, and in view of the contract of
sale of the stock of goods. The monthly payment of $100, referred
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